Affirming on Other Grounds at the Federal Circuit

Droplets v. Iancu (Supreme Courtroom 2018)

A new petition for writ of certiorari issues the extent that the Federal Circuit can affirm a PTAB IPR conclusion on grounds different than those relied on by the Board.

The rule in the Federal Circuit sure, affirmance-on-other-grounds is allowed so extensive as the Federal Circuit does not have to have to choose new problems of “fact, coverage, or company knowledge.”  In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Federal Circuit’s method is in some volume of pressure with the Chenery doctrine of Administrative legislation which advises courts to “judge the propriety of [agency] action exclusively by the grounds invoked by the company.” SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).  Droplets asks the query:

No matter whether “an agency’s action need to be upheld, if at all, on the foundation articulated by the company itself” (State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50), or no matter if a courtroom can substitute its very own sights for the agency’s every time the situation is “legal in nature” (In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).

There are a number of difficulties with Droplets case below – most pointedly is the fact that the Federal Circuit did not expressly rule on other grounds, but instead affirmed without view (R.36).  Below, the Droplets argument comes from a “tacit” admission from the PTO Solicitor that the Board’s foundation for its conclusion was insufficient.

Go through the petition: droplets v. iancu–cert.petition–FILED

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Dennis Crouch


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