The Political Economy of Hatch-Waxman

My colleague, Professor Erika Lietzan (Missouri) has produced a truly exciting and complete post strolling via the heritage of the Hatch-Waxman laws approach starting with some proposals in the 1970s via its passage in 1984.  The post is vital in the midst of rising calls for reform of the method.

She writes:

[T]he common wisdom about the Hatch–Waxman Amendments — as a privately negotiated compromise amongst the innovative and generic industries in which just about every received and just about every shed — is incorrect. . . . The real truth is a lot more nuanced, and the stability of positive aspects and expenses various.

In essence – and at the hazard of oversimplification – Prof. Lietzan argues that this compromise analysis ignores the vital anticipated broad social gain of generic involvement championed by Rep. Waxman and Public Citizen.  Lietzan writes that the outcome of this community alliance with generic entrants “made generic corporations greater off, and it created patent homeowners even worse off.”  That end result can not be explained by the traditional insider-negotiated tale.

Browse a draft in this article: Erika Lietzan, The Political Financial state of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments (March 13, 2018). Seton Corridor Law Evaluate, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:



Dennis Crouch

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